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Abstract
The article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and
even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its
influential interpretation by Robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I
argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant
and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as
an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a prac-
tical point of view’.
Keywords: German Idealism, Kant, Fichte, Spirit, postulate, teleology, mecha-
nism, naturalism, self-legislation, autonomy, assumption, faith, Science of Logic,
Idea, intentional stance, transcendental philosophy, voluntarism, compatibilism,
objectivity, action. 
Resumen
El artículo explora el concepto supuestamente no metafísico – no voluntarista,
incluso no causal – de la libertad que se perfila en la obra de Hegel y discute la
influyente interpretación que de él hace Robert Pippin como concepto ‘esencial-
mente práctico’. Razono que la afirmación de Hegel de la libertad debe ser distin-
guida de la de Kant y la de Fichte, pues no está basada en un entendimiento previo
de la autoconciencia como relación originalmente teleológica y no tiene la natu-
raleza de una afirmación ‘desde un punto de vista práctico’.
Palabras clave: Idealismo alemán, Kant, Fichte, espíritu, postulado, teleología,
mecanismo, naturalismo, autolegislación, autonomía, suposición, fe, ciencia de la
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Since 1989, Robert Pippin has been promoting an influential ‘non-metaphysi-
cal’ interpretation of Hegel, an interpretation which emphasizes the commonalities
between his work and Kant’s and where the whole system revolves around a doc-
trine of self-consciousness.1 According to Pippin, and in spite of appearances,
Hegel’s work developed the Kantian project of establishing the conditions that
allow for the consciousness of all subjectivity, by way of a correction of the – ratio-
nalist – correction Fichte had already made.2 In his commentary, spirit is not con-
sidered as a supernatural, Cartesian principle or substance that manifests itself motu
proprio, over time, in the lives of individuals and peoples, themselves understood
as more or less blind means of its teleological – and, except for the philosopher,
unintelligible – manifestation.3 For Pippin’s Hegel, the spiritual is the space of the
norms that individuals set for themselves in order to regulate their own lives; and,
by extension, it is the space of individuals themselves, their lives, and the many
dimensions of those lives – such as art, religion and philosophy – to the extent that
they bind themselves to those man-made rules, be they obeyed or not with more or
less zeal and success.4
There is a natural extension of this general interpretation in Pippin’s relatively
more recent analyses of Hegel’s theory of freedom.5 In this case as well, he discerns
a non-metaphysical concept of freedom in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit and a proj-
ect (descended from Kant) of understanding the conditions that must be fulfilled in
order to render possible our (modern) self-understanding as agents who give them-
selves their own norms (or our rational identification with our actions, which is
equivalent according to his analysis). Furthermore, Pippin also perceives a degree
of adhesion to a Kantian model, despite a radicalising correction that can be consid-
ered Fichtean and, ultimately, despite the existence of an irreducible Hegelian orig-
inality. In this sense, it can be said that both the general interpretation and its exten-
sion to the philosophy of (subjective and objective) spirit identify a continuous line
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1 See Pippin (1989), pp. 6, 92, 166f.
2 See Pippin (1989), p. 39 and Pippin (2000a), pp. 165f.
3 Among the targets of his critique of metaphysical readings is the interpretation of Charles Taylor
(1975), which had considerable resonance in the English-speaking world. At any rate, Taylor’s recep-
tion – especially in Taylor 1985 – has a decisive influence on Pippin’s work, as I will later point out.
4 The spirit would be “a certain form of collective mindedness” (Pippin 1999, p. 202) or “the achieve-
ment of a collective normative mindedness” (2008, p. 17; see pp. 14 n. 14, 122). By and large, this
understanding of ‘the spiritual’ is shared by other relevant contemporary vindicators of Hegel’s
thought, such as Vittorio Hösle (1987) and Robert Brandom (2009).
5 See especially Pippin (1999), Pippin (2000b), Pippin (2000c) and Pippin (2008).
between the thought of those three German idealists, one that does not break but
partly changes its direction and substance. The result is a suggestion that Hegel’s
idealism cannot be clarified without specifying its dialectical relationships with the
work of his predecessors, Kant and Fichte.
In the following, I wish to question Pippin’s specific way of understanding this
continuity and, therefore, the way he views Hegel’s philosophical project as well as
the idiosyncrasy of his idealism. Nevertheless, I shall not propose to forsake the
whole of his non-metaphysical interpretation but only his understanding of Hegel’s
non-metaphysical concept of freedom and, more precisely, his way of representing
and accepting what we could call Hegel’s affirmation of freedom.
I think that Hegel does distance himself, as Pippin claims, from the traditional
voluntarist and metaphysical concept of freedom (the one that can be found, for
instance, in the fourth of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy), but without
resorting to an ‘empirical’ compatibilist concept like Hume’s, which might not be
metaphysical but still remains causal (in fact, one can observe how Hegel literally
and simultaneously wishes to avoid empirical and metaphysical understandings).6
Textual proofs of this can be sought, as Pippin has done, in key passages where
Hegel argues against the notion of free will, denies that the category of causality can
be used to understand the connection between the subject and her actions, questions
the necessary existence of antecedent intentions – which could serve as causes – in
deeds and, above all, does not define spirit as an entity and freedom as a power – or
the quality of a power – that characterises this entity, but defines both, spirit and
freedom, as an achievement.
What I wish to debate is that, immediately after, such a non-metaphysical con-
cept is said to be ‘essentially practical’. Of course, one could think that when Pippin
characterises the concept as practical, even essentially practical, he is only claiming
that it is neither a causal-metaphysical nor a causal-empirical concept, because it is
the concept of a status, of an identification relationship, the – precisely practical –
effect of certain historically consolidated social relations of mutual recognition
among equals.7 But Pippin overburdens the characterization of the concept as prac-
tical by aligning his interpretation on the idealist idea of a ‘primacy of practical rea-
son’. 8 It is, I think, such a line of interpretation that leads him to sustain that Hegel
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6 See Hegel (1822), p. 217. See also a commentary of this passage in Pippin (2008), p. 109.
7 A condensed presentation of the concept of freedom Pippin attributes to Hegel can be found in Pippin
(1999) and Pippin (2008), chap. 1.
8 See Pippin (2008), pp. 37 n. 4, 104. Although Pippin occasionally equates the ‘primacy of the prac-
tical’ with the undeniable ‘primacy of the ethical’ in the Rechstphilosophie, the sense in which his
interpretation highlights a Fichtean vein (see Pippin 2008, p. 37) is one where the ‘authority of the con-
cept’ is established “by experiencing over time the practical impossibility of denying such authority”
(Pippin 2008, p. 104), which is a variation of a historical sort on the basic Kantian experience of not
being able to act except ‘under the idea of freedom’.
eludes or avoids one of the most intractable and pressing problems for Kant and
Fichte, that which consists in understanding and successfully assuming the possibil-
ity of the effectiveness of practical reason’s imperatives.9And this is also what leads
him to clarify the way in which Hegel refers to concepts that give themselves their
own actuality by resorting to Kantian arguments.10
As I understand him, Pippin thinks that when we follow Hegel in conceiving the
self-legislation of the will as a collective and historical achievement, the problem of
the content of rational practical imperatives – the so-called problem of formalism –
as well as the problem of its binding nature – its authority – and of its feasibility are
solved once and for all. Consequently, Pippin requires the reader to distinguish
between the primacy of practical reason Kant and Fichte subscribe to and the pri-
macy that supposedly binds Hegel. According to his reasoning, Kant and Fichte
assumed the validity and ‘reality’ of moral imperatives based on the view that we
cannot act but under the idea of their feasibility and, thus, according to a moral
judgement of our situation, impossible to avoid. Hegel’s originality would rest on
the fact that he does not see this as a trait of human psychology, namely, in a
Kantian way, but rather as a ‘logical’ obligation, a consequence of the impossibili-
ty to make sense of intentional actions, starting with our own, without adopting the
perspective of freedom. But to the extent that, arguably, Fichte’s rationalist correc-
tion of Kant already leads us to perceive such a logical necessity, Hegel’s novelty
should strictly and definitely be found in the sort of historical and phenomenologi-
cal argument he puts forward to account for the binding and not unrealisable nature
of self-legislation.
In my view, the problem with this interpretation, which as we shall see relies
heavily on a phenomenological argument, is that it subjects the affirmation of the
perspective of freedom in Hegel’s work to the condition that it should make intelli-
gible the intrinsically teleological nature of consciousness, a nature that is taken for
granted from the outset. This is the point of view from which the problem of the
effectiveness of the ‘moral law’, rather than dissolving, turns out to have been dis-
solved in advance, although we have only become aware of this historically. And
yet, it could be argued that Hegel builds his Logic in order to prove, precisely, with-
out such a presumption of subjectivity, the ‘truth of teleology’. It seems to me that,
consequently, the examination of the affirmation of teleology in the Logic shall end
up suspending the interpretation of Pippin, a reading that certainly deserves the
label of Fichtean and is itself guided by a commitment to the primacy of practical
reason.
In this essay, I start out by explaining the original – Kantian and Fichtean –
meaning of the ‘practical’ reality of freedom (section 1). I then offer a short account
of Hegel’s general reception of Kant and Fichte’s philosophy, which leads to the
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9 See Pippin (2008), pp. 18f., 57.
10 See Pippin (2000c), p. 185.
conclusion that Hegel does not accept that reality (section 2). Next, I relate Pippin’s
efforts to express the continuity, in spite of appearances, between the practical real-
ity of freedom as Kant and Fichte understand it and the – also practical – reality it
would have, in his opinion, for Hegel (section 3). In the last section (4), I attempt
to show that the argument in the final part of the Science of Logic obliges us to deny
that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom follows a Kantian model and, from there, to
conclude that Hegel’s concept of freedom may be non-metaphysical, but not based
on the ‘primacy of the practical’.
1. Kant and Fichte on the practical reality of freedom
In Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, Pippin sometimes depicts Hegel’s conception
of freedom as unprecedented, a historical novelty.11 Nevertheless, in other and not
less significant places, Hegel’s concept is presented as a successor – albeit an
evolved one – of the Kantian concept of autonomy.12 What is more, Pippin’s book
defends that Hegel’s doctrine obeys to a Kantian ‘model’ and connects with some
foundational claims of the Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, in particular
with the Kantian demonstration of the supreme and inevitable authority of reason in
matters of practical deliberation and action.13
Certainly, the concept of free will outlined by Hegel in the introduction of the
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts is a formally Kantian one in the sense that
it is the concept of a will whose object is freedom itself, a freedom that somehow
consists – as in the Kantian view – in the ‘elevation of the particular to the univer-
sal’. However, it is more or less beyond doubt that Kant perpetuated the
Augustinian and Cartesian voluntarist tradition by embracing an incompatibilist
dualist conception, and that his concept of freedom is causal since for Kant,
undoubtedly, the freedom of the will is the property by which it determines itself –
or can determine itself – with independence of everything empirical.14 As a matter
of fact, the Critique of Practical Reason is an attempt to prove that we do possess
that power of leeway freedom or, lacking such a demonstration, that we cannot – in
some way to be clarified – stop believing in it.15
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11 See Pippin (2008), pp. 40, 46.
12 More exceptionally, Pippin acknowledges a neo-Aristotelian dimension in Hegel’s philosophy of
spirit, something Hegel himself observes, as is well known, in the Encyclopedia, but Pippin neverthe-
less wants to emphasise the non-naturalist character of Hegel’s concept, so that he tends to downplay
that influence (see Pippin 2008, pp. 15, 57f., 115). On the originality of the Hegelian concept, see
Rorty (1999), p. 214.
13 See Pippin (2008), pp. 18f., 69 n. 4, 105ff.
14 See Kant (1788), p. 97.
15 See Kant (1788), p. 30. Much has been said about a putative Kantian compatibilism (see, for
instance, Wood 1984), but my traditional reading follows the perspective defended in Allison (1990).
Pippin sees in Hegel a continuity with the Kantian approach in the sense that
Hegel, like Fichte before him, is not satisfied by a concept of freedom where the
ends of the subject are strictly pre-established or alien to her (deep-rooted desires,
innate inclinations, adventitious goals, etcetera). Such an ‘empiricism of freedom’,
as we could call it, is precisely what Hegel finds unbearable about the concept of
free will (Willkür), a concept he characterises as inherently contradictory, since it
contains the idea of an ‘infinite’ choice among inevitably ‘finite’ alternatives.16
However, Pippin’s Hegel also distances himself from the contradictory, puta-
tively Kantian idea of a freedom that sets its own ends – or norms – out of nothing.
It could very well be said that Kant, Fichte and Hegel represent successive attempts
to overcome the latter contradiction without falling into what I call an empiricism
of freedom. Another way of framing the issue faced by all three, one that is favoured
in Pippin’s work, is the following: reason obliges me to give myself a law that I can
consider universally valid, but what obliges me to be rational in this sense? Note
that such a law prevents the agent from immediately embracing any end that could
appeal to her. This is a different way to formulate the same question, for in all cases
the difficulty lays in understanding the step that leads from the absence to the pres-
ence of an obligation.
Later on I will return to this problem. For now, let us mention that the idealists
also agreed, at least in principle, that philosophy must not only explain how a
rational norm binds us and what content it has (a matter on which, as is well known,
Kant and Hegel did not agree at all, to the extent that Hegel always thought Kant
had been unable to give content to his moral philosophy, accused him of formalism
and considered his aspirations to a ‘complete determination’ of the imperative as
frustrated), but also how that norm can, at least to a certain extent, be observed and
effectively govern our lives.
It is in this respect that the concept of freedom itself became, in the Critique of
Practical Reason, ‘practical’ in a very specific sense. For this is where Kant gave
birth to the so-called ‘postulates of practical reason’, which are claims made with-
out any knowledge – any experience – of their objects, but anyhow made and even
taken to be true by virtue of a practical necessity. Seven years earlier, Kant had
defined the ‘practical’, in a very general sense, as all that was linked to a will that
is answerable to reasons, all that was not exclusively determined by passions (that
is to say, ‘pathologically’), all that had to do, as Aristotle would say, with ‘what
could be otherwise’ as a result of human action and production.17 In this sense, a
practical necessity was a necessity that stemmed from our capacity to respond to
reasons when acting, at least to the extent, metaphysically neutral in principle, that
the considerations and reflections of others could change our opinion on our cir-
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16 See Hegel (1821), § 15.
17 See Kant (1781/87), A 802.
cumstances, our view of the future and our intentions (in the first Critique, Kant
labelled this capacity as ‘practical freedom’). In the Foundations, this disposition to
heed reasons was interpreted by Kant as a ‘practical’ obligation to accept that we
are agents, that we can autonomously bring about states and that consequently,
when acting, we can escape neither prudential considerations (is this in my inter-
est?) nor moral ones (should I do it? am I allowed to?).18
The postulates of practical reason rescued some of the objects of inherited meta-
physics from the questionable privilege of being – in Kantian terminology – ‘ideas
of reason’. In the first Critique, the ideas of reason had turned out to be impossible
to cancel, but also unknowable: as may be recalled, the book made room for faith,
but not for the knowledge of the objects of faith. As for freedom, Kant had come in
1781 to view it as a virtually unintelligible idea, since it violated the ‘principle of
the understanding’ according to which all events (as objects) were temporally deter-
mined by the incidence of other events. In 1788, however, when developing the
Foundations’ observation that we could not act except ‘under the idea of freedom’,
Kant came to the conclusion that the moral law to which we subject our delibera-
tions could be considered as ratio cognoscendi of freedom. However, the objective
reality he then attributed to freedom – as well as to God and the immortality of the
human soul – did not imply the existence of freedom or the objects of other ideas
but the practical need to take them as true.19
The Foundations’ foundational claims invoked in Pippin’s explanation of the
Hegelian doctrine are precisely those that link our usual situation as non-patholog-
ically obliged beings (practically free beings, in the terminology of the first
Critique) to what will later be called the postulate of freedom. In the second
Critique, where the argument is clarified, Kant explains why our awareness of the
dictates of a reason we conceive as categorically imposing norms of conduct estab-
lishes – although always only from a practical perspective – that we cannot deny
being subjected to that law and even that we can act accordingly, if only because the
mere intellectual contemplation of the law produces a favourable disposition of the
will.20 This, says Kant, is the relationship that extends the theoretical knowledge of
the will, although only ‘in a practical sense’, as is clarified there as well.21
If we consider that Hegel, in his Logik, defines ‘ideas’ as concepts that give
themselves their own actuality, there is at least a verbal coincidence between his
work and the doctrine of the postulates of reason in Kant’s second Critique. The
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18 See Kant (1781/87), A 533, A803 and Kant (1785), p. 448.
19 See Kant (1788), pp. 134f. Willascheck comments: “when Kant says that these ideas of God, free-
dom and immortality ‘receive [...] objective reality’ (e.g. 5:135), this does not mean that their objects
really exist (even though that is what the postulates postulate), but rather that the content of these ideas
is specific enough in order to refer to determinate objects” (2010, p. 191).
20 See Kant (1788), pp. 46, 65f., 105f. and Kant (1785), pp. 401f.
21 Kant (1788), p. 135.
question that seems to me much less clear and nevertheless important is whether the
coincidence is more than verbal.
In my opinion, more visible continuities can be found between the Kantian doc-
trine and that of Fichte, the intermediary, to which I will briefly turn. If the basic
intentions of the first Critique can be summarised as making room for faith in free-
dom (and the moral meaning of human life), the motivations of the Doctrine of
Knowledge might well be summarised, at least in its first versions, as strictly refut-
ing Spinoza’s dogmatism, precisely because of its denial of freedom.22A small indi-
rect proof of this is Fichte’s suspicious reception of the Philosophical Letters pub-
lished by his admirer Schelling (in two 1795/1796 issues of the Journal edited by
Fichte and a colleague) precisely because he saw Schelling’s opposition to dogma-
tism as lukewarm. As the ‘Introductions’ to the Wissenschaftslehre in 1797 and
1798 made clear, Fichte then thought the dogmatic position somehow undermined
itself and could be proven untenable.23
However, in the 1800 writing on The Vocation of Man – which supposedly reit-
erates and divulges the positions outlined in the Doctrine of Knowledge, the
Foundations of Natural Law and the System of Ethics of the Jena period (as a mat-
ter of fact the formulae of the 1800 writing inspired a large part of Hegel’s 1802 cri-
tique of Fichte’s early philosophy) – Fichte interprets the principles of his doctrine
as perfectly concordant with the Kantian account of ‘pure practical rational
belief’.24 As he argues in that work, what knowledge cannot settle about our nature
as intelligent and moral beings, even about intelligence and freedom as ‘non-natu-
ral powers’, is established precisely by an organ called ‘faith’, a faith aroused, as in
the Critique of Practical Reason, by the consciousness of the moral law.25
Thus, when Pippin traces back to Fichte’s arguments – as he does in 2008 –
what he calls Hegel’s ‘non-naturalism’, denoted by Hegel’s putative view that nat-
ural – scientific – explanations of our activities in terms of natural properties could
not be satisfactory,26 one gets the arguably misleading impression that Hegel fol-
lows Fichte – and also Kant – along the path that goes from the consciousness of a
moral law to the faith in freedom, and that he neither aspires to nor has a different
argument which could allow for an affirmation of freedom that would not be ‘nec-
essary but purely practical’, in the sense Kant and Fichte support it.
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22 By that time, Jacobi had taken it upon himself to highlight this, in case it was not already notorious
(see Jacobi 1785, Appendix VII). As is well known, Fichte was driven by the Critique of Practical
Reason to abjure a deterministic and fatalistic worldview that he earlier had considered inevitable.
23 See Fichte (1797), p. 510.
24 I take the expression from Kant (1788), p. 144.
25 See Fichte (1800), p. 98.
26 See Pippin (2008), p. 62.
2. Hegel’s originality
However, the sharp critiques Hegel devotes to his idealist predecessors in the
Jena ‘critical writings’ – especially in the Differenzschrift and in “Glauben und
Wissen” – renders a reading of this sort highly implausible. The problem we must
now address is how to understand Pippin’s insistent claim that the concept is prac-
tical, ‘essentially practical’, and that there is a line, albeit one ‘complex and knot-
ty’, that leads from Kant to Hegel in this respect, while acknowledging Pippin’s
awareness of this critique, an awareness which leads him to say that Hegel could
not have been satisfied with the ‘practically unavoidable assumption of freedom’.27
If the issue at hand were a marginal one, if it had not been an essential part of a
core of transcendental philosophy later to be overcome by post-Kantian idealism,
perhaps one could admit this specific continuity without having to reject the global
discontinuity. As is well known, however, one of the main areas of friction between
the transcendental system and the non-transcendental one, which Hegel called spec-
ulative and defended, was the epistemological standpoint adopted by both Kant and
Fichte, faithful heirs of the Cartesian paradigm, when discussing all knowledge-
related issues, including the origin and status of our non-empirical ideas such as
freedom.28 Hegel thought that this framework gave rise to intractable difficulties
and irremediably left out of sight, in favour of scepticism, the authentic scientific
perspective. His Phenomenology of Spirit set out to counteract that modern ortho-
doxy by, in a way, criticising the critique, in order to transcend the perspective of
‘consciousness’. This operation could not be indifferent to the balance between the-
oretical knowledge and practical philosophy Kant had envisaged in an original way.
That epistemological standpoint led Kant to an open dualism, to the separation
of the conditions of all experience from the conditions of all speculation (in other
words, to the separation of the conditions of sensibility from the conditions of intel-
ligibility); in fact, Kant occasionally weighed, at the fringe of critical discourse,
‘metaphysical’ materialist possibilities that reason – he thought – could not resolve
in either way.29 Therefore, the critique of practical reason Kant made public in
1788, including the so-called moral arguments in favour of freedom, immortality
and divinity (the main themes of Descartes’ metaphysical meditations) necessarily
had to be received as a palliative that connected and harmonised concepts the
Critique of Pure Reason had originally set apart. As early as 1801, Hegel judged
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27 Pippin (2008), pp. 13f., 41. See the concise way in which this is anticipated in Pippin (1989), p. 288
and also Pippin (2008), pp. 45, 277. Remarkably, in other occasions he tries to play down the Jena cri-
tiques by saying that Hegel then knew which idealism was unacceptable, but not which form a ‘true’
one needed to have (see Pippin 1989, p. 61).
28 Some proofs of Fichte’s acute epistemological Cartesianism can be found, for instance, in Fichte
(1798/99), pp. 430, 435, 439.
29 For two famous examples of those speculations, see Kant (1781/87), A 803 and Kant (1790), B 351.
that Kant’s ideas ‘lacked reality’, a conclusion he thought should be reached after a
thorough study of Kant’s moral philosophy.
Fichte tried to get rid of dualism, scepticism and the space Kant left to materi-
alist speculation by finding his way, ascending, to what he considered the basic
principle of the Critique: the self-consciousness of one’s spontaneous activity (or,
more precisely, the underlying unity of that self-consciousness). But that ascension
also ran into some obstacles. From the outset, the nature of the principle became an
object of controversy and consequently required successive clarifications. Schelling
understood that invoking an intellectual intuition as a principle did not disfigure the
practical and postulatory nature of the activity to which the intuition was applied.
After all, as the System of Ethics highlighted, the principle was no more and no less
than a certainty (of subjectivity) on one’s activity: “I find myself to be acting effi-
caciously in the world of sense. All consciousness arises from this discovery.
Without this consciousness of my own efficacy [Wirksamkeit], there is no self-con-
sciousness; without self-consciousness, there is no consciousness of something else
that is not supposed to be I myself”.30
If Hegel ever doubted it (he found out about Fichte’s theoretical and public rise
in part indirectly as well as belatedly, while working as a tutor in Bern and
Frankfurt, immersed in the study of Kant’s work), things must have been cleared up
by the atheism controversy and the publication of The Vocation of Man, the short
work mentioned above. If Fichte had reduced the space of speculation, it was not
through a theoretical extension of knowledge. With all we knew, he wrote, it was
perfectly compatible for the self to be a fiction, a mere representation, similar to that
of any other phenomenon.31 From that abyss, he continued, we could only be saved
by an unavoidable moral consciousness and a corresponding faith in the idea that
we were the adequate targets of its appeals, true agents of our destiny and, thus,
liable to moral judgement.32
However, Hegel apparently perceived an incongruity between the aspirations of
Fichte’s system – including its accompanying declarations – and its results. In 1802,
he wrote that Kant’s system was preferable to Fichte’s, since Kant at least was
aware of the restricted, qualified nature of his claims. What I have called Kant’s
materialist speculations were a proof of that consciousness. In Hegel’s opinion,
however, Fichte ignored or pretended to ignore that the principle of his Doctrine –
as for Kant, faith – was a subjective one: he did not recognise the subjective char-
acter of the initial postulate.33 For many readers – including Schelling who, during
his polemic correspondence with Fichte, appealed to what he took to be the percep-
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30 Fichte (1798), p. 22.
31 See Fichte (1800), p. 83.
32 See Fichte (1800), pp. 94, 128.
33 See Hegel (1802), p. 345.
tive analysis in Hegel’s Differenzschrift – Hegel’s conclusion definitively sealed the
fate of the Wissenschaftslehre.34
Particularly in the light of “Glauben und Wissen”, it is difficult to accept that
Hegel endorsed the primacy of practical reason in the affirmation of freedom, based
on the lack of any argument – as was apparently the case for Kant and Fichte – that
would lead to its affirmation without assuming the (subjective) certainty of one’s
activity or the inevitability of a postulate (as difficult as to accept that Hegel deeply
misunderstood the relationship between his system and Fichte’s). What would need
to be cleared up is which other argument he relied on in order to avoid renouncing
to freedom. In my opinion, this must be sought in the Science of Logic, a work
Hegel himself saw as containing an ‘ontological argument’ that was not in favour
of the traditional God but precisely of ‘personality’, ‘Ichheit’ and ‘freedom’ in gen-
eral.35 It was in the Logic that Hegel tried to resolve the antinomy between freedom
and determinism in a way that differed from Kant’s.36
Pippin, on the contrary, thinks that a non-Kantian strategy to affirm freedom can
mainly be found in the Phenomenology, although it ultimately leads, whether we
like it or not, to a practical sort of affirmation. For all these reasons, I will devote
the next two sections to comparing and contrasting his interpretation of the origi-
nality of the – neither Kantian nor merely Fichtean – phenomenological argument
with what I think we should learn about freedom in the final sections of the Logic.
3. Pippin’s ‘primacy of the practical’ affirmation of freedom
The hermeneutical paradox raised by Pippin’s interpretation is this: what does
Hegel have to deplore about Kant’s and Fichte’s arguments if his concept of free-
dom is, in the end, ‘essentially practical’?
Now, Pippin thinks that Hegel’s corrections do not have so much to do with the
practical nature of the affirmation of freedom as with the argumentative strategy
used to make sense of the idea that some concepts give themselves their own actu-
ality. In particular, he sees Kantian freedom as bootstrapping itself out of the waters
of heteronomous ends, with Kant failing to go beyond the metaphorical character of
the operation under scrutiny and reduce – eventually sweep away – its mystery. In
2008, he finds that such metaphors and obscurities are supported by a so-called
‘logical’ argument whereby the control, vigour and effectiveness of reason over
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35 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 549.
36 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, pp. 442f.
spirit are affirmed by Kant and Fichte without qualification.37 The argument con-
cludes with the observation that we cannot act but under the idea of freedom, which
means, for Kant and Fichte, that we cannot act but under the supreme authority of
reason over actions. More concretely, Pippin calls logical (or deductive) the
Fichtean argument that shows how the dogmatic attempt to think of and obey norms
that are not self-imposed undermines itself, for in order to legitimate that subjec-
tion, we must previously give in to the authority of the criteria about what we ration-
ally need to do.
According to Pippin, Hegel, unlike his predecessors, did not accept that ‘logi-
cal’ argument as such but did accept its conclusion, all of which would have caused
him to offer an alternative ‘developmental’ argument.38 That other argument –
Pippin also calls it narrative, dialectical or internal – must let us see how we can
radically oblige ourselves to behave rationally (in the Kantian sense where reason
is an end in itself that daily imposes concrete ends) in a way that makes it impossi-
ble for this obligation to be unrealisable or remain as a matter of fact unrealised. The
argument views the obligation of self-legislation as a historical achievement, to the
extent that the individual, over time, has come to live consciously and almost exclu-
sively according to self-established norms. Unlike Kant seemed to think, it is not
that I, or any other particular subject, dictate what should be done and why from a
normative vacuum, but rather that we give ourselves our own norms as we get
involved as participants in activities defined and regulated progressively and joint-
ly by our ancestors and peers.
Hegel’s intention would therefore consist in reaching the Kantian conclusion of
autonomy through an original analysis of real, historical, previously frustrated
attempts to abide by external norms found in nature or in – internal or external –
supernatural voices. Pippin compares this strategy to the initial argument of
Hobbes’ Leviathan.39 According to Hobbes, we can imagine a state of nature where
each individual’s desire for security would produce growing threats, fears, uncer-
tainties and, ultimately, insecurity, so that there arises a need for an absolute power
to undercut actual and latent violence. During this process, we see how certain
norms give way to new ones – first, all seek their own satisfaction, ‘do their own
thing’, then they postpone that satisfaction in order to threaten and attack, and final-
ly they reject the politics of hostilities in favour of absolute power and general sub-
mission – because of the practical difficulties of abiding by one or the other. In the
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Kant based on the fact that he – at least sometimes – interprets transcendental conditions as imposed
by the idiosyncrasy of our cognition and not by the rationality of human beings (see again Kant 1790,
B 351), Pippin usually tends – for good reasons I think – to take Kant’s argument as a logical one.
38 See Pippin (2008), pp. 90, 109f., 126.
39 See Pippin (2008), p. 126.
same way, the Hegelian phenomenological argument reconstructs – with tolerable
idealisations – the historical process through which man emerges ‘from his self-
incurred immaturity’, in Kant’s words, and understands that the norms he can and
must abide by are human creations whose only authority is the one he confers them.
In this way, the argument supposedly exposes the partiality of pre-modern histori-
cal attempts to establish normative authorities.40
We cannot deny Pippin that Hegel did choose such a historical path in order to
explain the emergence of material norms where they did not exist and how, in this
sense, the enlightened ideal of autonomy, whose main theorist allegedly was Kant,
can be realised.41 Since these norms are collective historical products, habits, prac-
tices and established institutions, aspects of what Hegel calls ‘the ethical’ (die
Sittlichkeit), this account can be said to explain why the individuals never face a
normative void and how the norms that govern their activities nevertheless are truly
human creations.
But as I have reminded, one of the central questions of Kantian (and Fichtean)
practical philosophy, not to say the main one, is that of how we, particular individ-
uals, solicited as we are by passions or by the senses generally speaking, can obey
the norm (or norms) of reason, and it would need to be seen how the developmen-
tal argument resolves or – if not – dissolves this difficulty.
In what I understand as key parts of his argument, Pippin reasons as if Hegel
considered that the difficulty was, as a matter of course, dissolved, and he ultimate-
ly defends that Hegel does not accept – as a whole – ‘post-Kantian’ issues such as
the ‘problem of spontaneous causation in action’.42 In my opinion, the most para-
doxical aspect of this assessment is that Hegel’s rejection of those problems is
assimilated to, precisely, the practical solution of his predecessors, which Pippin
sees, as we have said, as a ‘model’. What is more, I do not think it can be said, con-
sidering the Science of Logic, that some of the most relevant Kantian problems in
the area of the foundations of the ‘metaphysics of morals’ were disregarded by
Hegel. On the contrary, I understand that when he asks, particularly in the Logic,
whether mechanism is the truth of teleology, teleology is the truth of mechanism or
neither of these, Hegel is seeking arguments to address the basic Kantian questions
about the reality of freedom and, as a matter of fact, he connects his discussion to
that on the ‘third antinomy’ in the Critique of Pure Reason.43
Pippin thinks that Hegel’s crucial observation is that the attempts to provide a
naturalist explanation of the events we see as actions are bound to fail in the same
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41 A good summary of Pippin’s reconstruction of this path can be found in Pippin (2005), pp. 391ff.
42 See again Pippin (2008), p. 57.
43 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, pp. 437, 441ff. Hegel sees that exploration as an elevation to the
‘essential viewpoint’ on the matter (Hegel 1812-1816, vol. 6, p. 443).
way and for the same reasons as the attempts to abide by norms that we have not
set ourselves. Of course, he accepts that we can find naturalist explanations of
actions, but not that they can be infinitely generalised, since we cannot extend them
to the actions that correspond or lead to those explanations (a large part of our
actions, certainly). This is how he interprets the thesis of the Logic according to
which “teleology is the truth of mechanism”.44 Pippin thus attributes to Hegel the
exact step by which Kant and Fichte linked the intelligibility of events – natural
phenomena or of any other kind – to the possibility of self-consciousness, under-
stood as a special relation of self-knowledge (as I mentioned at the outset, this move
characterises his global interpretation of Hegel). Generalisation is ultimately imped-
ed, Pippin assumes, for Fichtean reasons.45
One question that could be asked is whether the (Fichtean) argument that Pippin
reconstructs is Hegel’s, and another, different of course, is whether the argument is
binding. The dubious character of the latter statement can be suggested by the way
it recalls the argument of those who disdain the possibility of determinism because,
whether we like it or not, we can neither act nor react except in the light of the idea
of freedom. This can obviously be true, it can even, if I may use the expression,
realise freedom in practice, or to put it differently, it can be sufficient to explain the
cultural practices of praise and blame we are so familiar with, but ex hypothesi it
does not do away with the realistic speculative fears of those who think that our
relation to our fellow human beings and to ourselves is based on an illusion, as
recalcitrant and culturally insuperable as such an illusion may be.46 In the same
way, Pippin’s Fichtean argument also brings to mind the easy confusion that can
arise between the possibility of explaining some events in a naturalistic way and the
possibility of predicting them: even if the former were relatively straightforward a
posteriori, the latter could very well turn out to be unworkable.47
Even more dubious is the Hegelian nature of the argument, since it seems to pre-
suppose, by virtue of a subjective certainty, what it had set out to explain: the effi-
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and Stekeler-Weithofer (2005), as I have argued elsewhere (see Maraguat 2013).
45 In this case as well, Pippin occasionally labels such reasons as ‘logical’, which I think betrays a lack
of precision in the terminology of his work (see Pippin 2008, pp. 47 n. 15, 103). He might have been
induced to such a use by Sellars’ recourse to the term in an argument that, by the way, reminds Fichte’s
(see Sellars 1963), as Pippin himself points out (2008, pp. 41 n. 8, 62 n. 34).
46 Of course, I am thinking about one of the aspects of the critical reception of Strawson’s “Freedom
and Resentment” (1974). Just how recalcitrant is the idea, at least for those who have inherited the
Jewish or Christian culture, is brilliantly testified by Kafka’s Brief an den Vater (1921) and Baroja’s
El árbol de la ciencia (1911), but there have been noteworthy literary attempts to imagine it was less
recalcitrant than Kafka, Baroja or Strawson felt (the greatest of which is probably Camus’ L’étranger,
1942).
47 This kind of explanation is rigidly resisted on the basis of putatively Hegelian principles in Pippin
(2010), p. 9 and Pippin (2013), p. 12.
cacy of the subjective ends of which we are aware. In my opinion, Hegel aspires to
avoid precisely that principle, since “the Concept is to be regarded not merely as a
subjective presupposition but as the absolute foundation”, although “it can be so
only insofar as it has made itself the foundation”.48 I personally think that Pippin’s
interpretation of the ‘truth of mechanism’ does fit in with the arguments of Fichte
and others, but not with those of the Science of Logic.49 What I would agree with,
however, is that Hegel’s thesis on teleology, whose justification is provided in that
book, is key to a correct understanding of the affirmation of freedom.50 For this rea-
son, I now wish to point out what I think would be a more appropriate interpreta-
tion of that part of the Doctrine of the Concept.
4. Hegel’s neither Kantian nor Fichtean affirmation of freedom
In the Logic, the claim that teleology is the truth of mechanism has at least two
meanings: one that supports the transition between the sections on “Chemism” and
“Teleology” (and more specifically on the teleology of subjective ends or, in other
words, on the ‘external end’ as the first form of teleology) and another that applies
to the transition from the section on ‘Teleology’ to the chapter on ‘the Idea’ (and
more specifically to its first part, devoted to life as an internal end or an end-in-itself
[Selbstzweck]).51 That teleology is the truth of mechanism means, first, that what
Hegel calls the ‘externality’ of natural explanations – which amounts to what Hume
saw as the contingency of natural laws, the contingent way in which the objects we
regard as causes relate to those we regard as effects – corresponds to what we call
the externality of subjective ends as contrasted with the recalcitrant objectivity in
which we try to realise them.52 For that reason, the teleology discussed in
‘Objectivity’ (the penultimate part of the Wissenschaft der Logik) is, in the first
instance, a teleology of the intentional action of subjects facing a world that is not
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commentary in (2008), p. 101.
49 Kant was arguably much more sceptical on this point, at least in principle, so that he would have
deserved Hegel’s different and less critical judgement in “Glauben und Wissen”. Without going any
further, remember that in the 1785 Foundations Kant accepts the possibility that no one might ever
have acted according to the moral law purely by virtue of the representation of his duty (see Kant 1785,
p. 407).
50 It is symptomatic that Hegel’s Idealism, Pippin’s first presentation of his interpretation of Hegel’s
philosophy – whose third part was devoted to the Logic –, substantially disesteemed the section on
‘Teleology’ (see Pippin 1989, p. 245).
51 A broader discussion of Hegel’s thesis on teleology can be found in Maraguat (2013).
52 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 444. On the externality of natural explanations, see Kreines
(2004).
of their doing and where they try, with necessarily limited success and without any
certainties, to realise their own ends. Hegel thus puts the comprehension of inten-
tional action (the realisation of concepts in action) at the service of the explanation
of natural phenomena or, to be more precise, at the service of the general explana-
tion of the nature of natural events and causal relations (the realisation of concepts
in nature), albeit only provisionally (for he does it without mentioning what he
properly calls ‘ideas’, concepts that give themselves their own actuality, to which
he only devotes the last part of the work) and only to the extent that the externality
with which subjective ends are defined by reference to the objective space of their
realisation (and vice versa) serve as model for understanding the reciprocal exter-
nality of causal antecedents and their mechanical effects or, from a different per-
spective, the externality that separates objects and events as a whole from the way
we conceive them.
Ideas make an appearance in the last chapter, although initially also in a provi-
sional way, when the real natural ends incarnated by the living can subsequently be
discussed. For Hegel, living beings are the prime example of concepts that give
themselves their own actuality. The first point I would like to highlight in the short
space at my disposition is that the notion of ‘concepts that give themselves their
own actuality’ stems from the consideration – formulated in the section on
‘Teleology’ – that any attempt to realise subjective ends necessarily presupposes
means that already obey to a concept. Right from the start, Hegel points out that the
‘external end’ – typically associated to productive human action – can only realise
its goals through the intervention of some objective means. But such an interven-
tion, upon reflection, deserves a reiteration of this consideration: means cannot
become effective as means without being by themselves ‘end’ realisers.53 This can
be illustrated, for instance, with the observation that I can only try to reach a butter-
fly with a butterfly net to the extent that the butterfly net is serviceable, that is to
say, as it must be; otherwise, the attempt to catch the butterfly will not get under
way, however much I might wish to get my hands on the insect. At the same time,
I can only move the butterfly net appropriately if the hand that clasps it obeys me,
and I can only move the hand if certain nervous impulses that run through my body
produce appropriate muscular contractions and the like. In general, we must say
mere attempts presuppose some kind of success (what Hegel calls, according to my
reading, the ‘immediate subsumption’ of the presupposed object and the ‘disappear-
ance of mediation’), but not a properly intentional or personal one. On the contrary,
our ability to realise subjective ends depends on the existence of means that are
‘preordained’ to their realisation, not intentionally but – in a way – by themselves
(after all, one does not move one’s muscles in order to move the hands but rather
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moves the hands directly). I think this is the key teaching of the final part of the
‘Teleology’ section, which lays out the argument that leads to consider the internal
end as the ‘truth’ of the external end54 and, in this sense, the internal end as the truth
of the mechanism as a whole. Hegel considers that the idea of an instrumental tele-
ology – where the ends are external to the matter in which they must be realised, the
teleology discussed, fundamentally, in the chapter on ‘Objectivity’ – presupposes
the idea of a non-instrumental teleology, in other words, of ends that are as a mat-
ter of fact realised – to which the final chapter of the Science of Logic on ‘the Idea’
is devoted. It must however be noted that this does not involve subjective ends that
are realised simply or absolutely, as is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the
internal end is embodied, at least initially, by living beings in general. Only by
virtue of the impossibility for immediately realised ends to be treated as subjective
ends that presuppose an objectivity they actually lack can Hegel conclude that a
teleology which does not belong to subjective ends, namely, the teleology of the liv-
ing, is the ‘truth’ of the teleology which actually does characterise the ends that are
‘externally’ related to what is objective.
Even if I were mistaken about this, namely about what I take to be the thrust of
the main argument in the ‘Teleology’ section, and in particular about how we must
interpret the effective realisation of ends that any attempt to realise an end must pre-
suppose, I think the clear sequence that goes from the concept of mechanism to that
of ends, first subjective but then real ones (those Kant labelled ‘natural ends’), casts
doubt upon the idea that the truth of teleology – the affirmation of teleology –
should be interpreted according to the third part of Kant’s Grundlegung (what we
could call the psychological argument) or Fichte’s Second Introduction to the
Doctrine of Science (what I called the logical argument in the previous section), as
Pippin wishes. In fact, nowhere in the section on ‘Teleology’, where Hegel upholds
precisely the adoption of an ‘essential’ viewpoint on teleology, that is to say, one
that does not settle for the Kantian manoeuvre of the third Critique by which the
principle of finality becomes purely subjective and ‘interpretive’, does Hegel seem
to assume that there are subjective ends whose realisation is evident and undeniable.
Nor does he seem to assume, as other interpreters do, that what could be called the
teleological truth of the mechanical is guaranteed by the frame of predictive and
pragmatic interests that make up the context of the investigation into the mecha-
nisms of nature.55
Subsequently, Hegel certainly notes that living beings realise their non-instru-
mental ends – their end is self-conservation, survival, growth and reproduction – in
the inevitably precarious and perishable manner that their physical incarnation tol-
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erates.56 But this does not foreclose, according to him, the possibility of affirming
the reality or effectiveness of natural ends through what he calls the ‘process of the
genus’, any more than does the fact that the animal – like the tool or the machine –
wears down or gets old precisely by realising its end, so that the moment where it
will cease to realise it, where it will die – or break down – draws ever and ever near-
er by virtue of realisation itself.57 This is the second – and, for the time being, the
last – point that I would like to highlight about the appearance of the idea of the
‘concept that gives itself its own actuality’ in the Logic. If it is right to say that the
wear induced by realisation and the resulting provisional character of realisation
does not ultimately impede us to speak of realisation, then an explicitly imperfect
realisation of the concept in the living does not leave pending – for subsequent sec-
tions of the Logic – the affirmation of concepts that give themselves their own actu-
ality and, therefore, it does not contradict what we have already said: that Hegel’s
argument in favour of the indispensability of thinking in terms of ends or realised
concepts is absolutely not based on a certainty with regard to subjectivity, on the
certainty that there obviously are or would be purposes – and therefore concepts –
that subjects realise (that I realise), even if in a purely ‘intelligible’ world like the
one Kant and Fichte imagined.
In my opinion, the problem with Pippin’s Fichteanising interpretation is that it
associates Hegel’s idealism to a fundamental obligation – an obligation that should
not go unheeded – to conceive ‘some kind of reflexive self-relation’ as the basis for
all consciousness and intentionality, that is to say, a teleologically organised self-
consciousness, ‘spirit’s own purposiveness’, and understand all theoretical judg-
ments and practical inferences under the condition of such a real relation of apper-
ception that, according to Kant, must be able to accompany all consciousness.58
This is an interpretive focus that, in my opinion, hardly fits in with the Logic’s argu-
ment about the ‘truth of the mechanism’ that we must seek and can find in the tele-
ology of the living.
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56 This partial incarnation cannot be discussed here with the attention it deserves. See Wolff (1992),
pp. 133f., DeVries (1991), p. 66 and Kreines (2004), pp. 59, 70. As Wolff has highlighted, one of the
main difficulties faced by the interpretation of Hegel’s doctrine on the living is to reconcile his criti-
cism of the way Kant downgrades the ‘principle of finality’ to a subjective maxim with his reluctance
to accept a purely objective finality of the organisms (see Hegel 1807, p. 143 and Hegel 1812-1816,
vol. 6, p. 468).
57 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 457. On the other hand, remember that Hegel explains, in the
Logic, that the finite in general – be it mechanical (or chemical) or intentional – can either be said to
be according to its concept (one or the other) or not to be according to its concept (see Hegel 1812-
1816, vol. 6, pp. 464f.).
58 See Pippin (2008), p. 49. On the central importance of this notion in his interpretation, see Pippin
(1989), p. 35. In the aforementioned 2008 page, Pippin speaks of the “centrality for Hegel of spirit’s
own purposiveness”. This point reveals the greatest continuity between the interpretation Pippin advo-
cates and Taylor’s ground-breaking work on Hegel’s philosophy of mind (Taylor 1985). On the puta-
tively essential relationship between perception and teleological character, see Pippin (1987).
Besides, it might be possible to conceive reasons for the indispensability of tele-
ological judgements that do not stem from a primordial and fundamental commit-
ment to what Fichte called an intellectual intuition of oneself as an agent.59 And if
it is so, we might be able to make sense of an affirmation of teleology that does not
depend on our undeniable familiarity with the realisation of subjective ends, an
affirmation such as the one Hegel, in my opinion, promotes. For instance, some
people nowadays think that without an intentional interpretation of what Darwin
called natural selection – one in which nature, the natural selection process, is
endowed with ‘perceptions’, ‘reasons’ and ‘choices’ (an attribution that allows us to
speak, precisely, of a ‘selection’) – we could not understand why living organisms
are as they are and what functions their organs carry out (and as a matter of fact, if
we did not observe functions, in other words, ends that are served by the organs and
systems of living beings, we would observe no organ, organic system or living
being). This would happen simply because the natural processes realise meaningful
patterns that are interpreted as perceptions, choices and reasoned actions and, in a
prior and more fundamental way, meaningful patterns that are interpreted as func-
tions.60 In fact, the Darwinian idea of evolution incorporates a process in which
‘mechanical’ relations result in a global effect that, since it realises a concept, we
could properly – from an idealist, Hegelian point of view – call ‘teleological’.
Similarly, the Hegelian idea of the realisation of an end or purpose implies its pro-
duction through mechanical and chemical processes:
A house, a clock, may appear as purposes with respect to the instruments employed in
their production; but the stones, the crossbeams, or the wheels, the axles, and the rest
that make up the actuality of the purpose, fulfill this purpose only through the pressure
which they suffer, through the chemical processes to which they are exposed with air,
light, and water, and from which they shield the human being; through their friction, and
so on. They fulfill their vocation (Bestimmung), therefore, only through their being used
up and worn out, and only by virtue of their negation do they correspond to what they
are supposed to be.61
This is obviously not the place to explore non-eliminationist naturalising pro-
grams in detail, but they can serve to illustrate arguments in favour of the indispens-
ability of what has been called ‘the intentional stance’ without relying on the pre-
supposition of the ‘original intentionality’ – to use John Searle’s term of art – of
human subjectivity (or realised subjective ends, or, in the words of Fichte,
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60 This is a fundamental thesis of Daniel Dennett’s theory of intentionality (see, for instance, Dennett
1987, pp. 314ff.).
61 Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 457 (translation by George di Giovanni).
‘Thathandlung’). In my opinion, if there is an argument in favour of the indispens-
ability of that ‘stance’ in Hegel’s work, it must rather be of that second type, one
that does not downgrade ‘the concept’ to a subjective presupposition – as necessary
as it may be, as historically established as it may seem – and requires a conception
of the teleological to be found halfway between the objective one propounded by
dogmatic realism and the subjective one put forward by transcendental philoso-
phy.62At any rate, I assume that Hegel’s resistance to pre-Darwinian evolutionism63
does not necessarily impede the argument of the Logic to be interpreted in a way
that anticipates a naturalist conception of ‘final causes’.64
Against this conclusion, it could be argued that if the intentional stance were
nothing more than a perspective from which some patterns become visible, the
Hegelian claim that teleology is ‘the truth of mechanism’ would not be totally
meaningful; in fact, Pippin seems to think that to downgrade the intentional – as
well as the living – to a pattern is to incur in naturalist physicalism, an excess Hegel
would absolutely not tolerate.65 I personally think it must be granted that, for Hegel,
teleological relations in general cannot be only apparent.66 But the arguments for
indispensability I am thinking about – those of Daniel Dennett, for instance – pre-
cisely insist that ‘intentional’ patterns – like functional ones – are real, that they are
out there to be discovered, and that if we do not adopt the intentional stance towards
them, we cease to understand natural regularities that are mechanical from a certain
perspective, but not from all perspectives.67 Furthermore, I think Hegel’s conviction
that any realisation of concepts is partial and precarious68 is an invitation to open
up to a conception of rule following – of the theoretical and practical application of
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63 See Hegel 1830, § 249.
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65 See Pippin (2008), p. 59 n. 30. However, I do not think Pippin is justified to say that Hegel antici-
pates and rejects – as ‘materialist’ – the weak and anomalous contemporary monisms and the modern
theories of emergence and supervenience (see Pippin 1989, p. 289 n. 17 and Pippin 1999, p. 210). See
Renault (2012), p. 265.
66 This is stated explicitly in Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 437.
67 See Dennett (2013), pp. 196, 239, 387. What is more, I think those arguments even make sense of
the notion of concepts that give themselves their own actuality, since it is claimed that all that is need-
ed to be intentional (or generally functional) is to be meaningful and intelligible from an intentional
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68 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 465.
concepts – that neither implies a need to assume any sort of perfect realisation nor,
therefore, the ‘primacy of practical reason’. 
Regardless of whether those contemporaneous arguments on the indispensabil-
ity of the ‘intentional stance’ (the Kantian ‘principle of finality’) can overcome the
objections they receive, an issue that should be left for another occasion, I hope to
have clearly indicated the reasons why an argument in favour of the indispensabil-
ity like the one Pippin attributes to Hegel does not fit in with two key dialectical
advances in the Wissenschaft der Logik.
One can therefore accept, as I do, that Hegel favours a non-metaphysical con-
ception of freedom in Pippin’s sense, but I think we should resist an interpretation
of that non-metaphysical character which entails a purely practical affirmation of
freedom – an affirmation based on the putatively irreducible nature of the first-per-
son point of view, on the ‘primacy of the practical’, within the horizon of self-con-
sciousness satisfaction – similar to the one Kant and Fichte apparently espoused and
subjected themselves to.69
References
ALLISON, H. (1990): Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
BRANDOM, R. B. (2009): Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press.
DENNETT, D. (1987): The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
DENNETT, D. (2013): Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, New York, W.
W. Norton & Company.
DEVRIES, W. A. (1991): “The Dialectic of Teleology”, Philosophical Topics, 19, pp.
51-70.
FICHTE, J. G. (1797): “Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, fur Leser, die
schon ein philosophisches System haben”, in I. H. Fichte (ed.) Fichtes Werke,
vol. 1. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1971, pp. 451-518.
FICHTE, J. G. (1798): Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der
Wissenschaftslehre, in I. H. Fichte (ed.), Fichtes Werke, vol. 4, Berlin, Walter de
Gruyter, 1971, pp. 1-365.
FICHTE, J. G. (1798/99): Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, in E. Fuchs (ed.),
Krause manuscript, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1994 (cited according to the
Gesamtausgabe pagination).
Edgar Maraguat Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2016): 111-134
131
69 The research for this paper was financially supported by the Spanish Government (Research Project
FFI2013-44481-P). My Canadian friend Pier-Luc Dupont helped me to turn the original Spanish ver-
sion into a readable English-language text and I am indebted to him for this.
FICHTE, J. G. (1800): Die Bestimmung des Menschen, ed. F. Medicus y H. D.
Brandt, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2000.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1801): “Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems
der Philosophie”, in H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler (eds.), Gesammelte Werke,
vol. 4, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1968, pp. 1-92.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1802): “Glauben und Wissen”, in H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler
(eds.), Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1968, pp. 315-414.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1807): Phänomenologie des Geistes, in E. Moldenhauer and K. M.
Michel (eds.), Werke, vol. 3, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1812-1816): Wissenschaft der Logik, in E. Moldenhauer and K.
M. Michel (eds.), Werke, vols. 5-6, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1970.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1821): Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in E.
Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.), Werke, vol. 7, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1970.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1822): “Fragment zur Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes”, in
Gesammelte Werke, vol. 15, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 207-249.
HEGEL, G. W. F. (1830): Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, in E.
Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.) Werke, vols. 8-10, Frankfurt am Main,
Suhrkamp, 1970.
HÖSLE, V. (1987): Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem
der Intersubjektivität, Hamburg, Felix Meiner.
JACOBI, F. H. (1785): Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses
Mendelssohn, ed. Marion Lauschke, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2000.
KANT, I. (1781/87): Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. J. Timmermann, Hamburg, Felix
Meiner, 1998.
KANT, I. (1785): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kant’s gesammelte
Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe, vol. IV, 1911.
KANT, I. (1788): Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften,
Akademie Ausgabe, vol. V, 1908.
KANT, I. (1790): Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. H. J. Klemme, Hamburg, Felix Meiner,
2001.
KREINES, J. (2004): “Hegel’s Critique of Pure Mechanism and the Philosophical
Appeal of the Logic Project”, European Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), pp. 38-
74.
MARAGUAT, E. (2013): “Mecanismo y teleología en la Lógica de Hegel”, Diánoia,
LVIII/70, pp. 59-87.
MCDOWELL, J. (2009): “Towards a Reading of Hegel on Action in the ‘Reason’
Chapter of the Phenomenology”, in Having the World in View,
Cambridge/London, Harvard University Press, pp. 166-184.
Edgar Maraguat Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2016): 111-134
132
PIPPIN, R. (1987): “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind”, in Idealism as Modernism:
Hegelian Variations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-55.
PIPPIN, R. (1989): Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
PIPPIN, R. (1999): “Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel’s Compatibilism”,
European Journal of Philosophy, 7(2), pp. 194-212.
PIPPIN, R. (2000a): “Fichte’s Alleged One-Sided, Subjective, Psychological
Idealism”, in S. Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 147-170.
PIPPIN, R. (2000b): “What is the Question for which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition
is the Answer”, European Journal of Philosophy, 8(2), pp. 155-172.
PIPPIN, R. (2000c): “Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: The Realization of Freedom”, in
K. Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, pp. 180-199.
PIPPIN, R. (2005): “Brandom’s Hegel”, European Journal of Philosophy, 13(3), pp.
381-408.
PIPPIN, R. (2008): Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
PIPPIN, R. (2010): “Participants and Spectators”, in http://onthehuman.org/2010/04/
participants_and_spectators/.
PIPPIN, R. (2013): “Back to Hegel?”, Mediations, 26(1–2), pp. 7-28.
RENAULT, E. (2012): “The Naturalistic Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism”, Critical
Horizons, 13(2), pp. 244-274.
RORTY, R. (2009): “Comment on Robert Pippin’s ‘Naturalness and Mindedness:
Hegel’s Compatibilism’”, European Journal of Philosophy, 7(2), pp. 213-216.
SELLARS, W. (1963): “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, in Science,
Perception and Reality, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 1-40.
STEKELER-WEITHOFER, P. (2005): Philosophie des Selbstbewußtseins. Hegels
System als Formanalyse von Wissen und Autonomie, Frankfurt am Main,
Suhrkamp.
STRAWSON, P. F. (1974), Freedom and Resentment, London, Methuen.
TAYLOR, Ch. (1975): Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
TAYLOR, Ch. (1985): “Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind”, in Human Agency and
Language: Philosophical Papers, 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
pp. 77-96.
WILLASCHEK, M. (2010): “The primacy of practical reason and the idea of a practi-
cal postulate”, in A. Reath and J. Timmermann (eds.), Kant’s Critique of
Practical Reason: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
pp. 168-196.
Edgar Maraguat Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2016): 111-134
133
WOLFF, M. (1992): Das Körper-Seele Problem. Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie
(1830), § 389, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
WOOD, A. W. (1984): “Kant’s Compatibilism”, in A. W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature
in Kant’s Philosophy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 73-101.
YEOMANS, Ch. (2012): Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency,
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Edgar Maraguat
Departament de Metafísica i Teoria del Coneixement
Universitat de València
edgarmaraguat@gmail.com
Edgar Maraguat Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
Revista de Filosofía
Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2016): 111-134
134
